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PUTTING BITE IN NEPA'S BARK: NEW COUNCIL 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REGULATIONS 
FOR THE PREPARATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENTS 
In response to increasing concern over the nation's environ-
ment and heightened legislative awareness of the dangers of un-
bridled technological advancement, 1 Congress passed the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 2 Through 
NEPA, Congress hoped to spawn increased administrative con-
cern for the environment by expressing substantive policies3 
which became part of the mandates of every federal agency• and 
' See E. D01..GIN & T. GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 433, 438 (1974). See also 
HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRONAlrrICS, INQUIRIES, LEGISLATION, POLICY STUDIES RE: 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITI'EE ON SCIENCE, 
RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RE-
SEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRONAlrrICS, MANAGING 
THE ENVIRONMENT 5-6 (1968); Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and 
the Congress, 68 M1cH.L.REv. 1073, 1074 (1970): "A new concern for values which cannot 
easily be translated into the language of the market place can be felt and seen in citizen 
efforts to save open spaces, parks, and natural beauty from poorly planned construction 
of freeways, reservoirs, and industrial plants." For a brief but revealing discussion of the 
various factors that led Congress to adopt a "national environmental policy," see R. AN-
DREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 2-3 (1976). 
Congress' concern about technological growth was aptly stated by Senator Jackson: 
We have, however, paid a price for our progress, and our prosperity. We have 
paid in the form of sluggish, rubbish laden rivers, air which is fouled with 
smoke and poisoned by chemicals, wasted forests and stripmined lands, extinct 
species of wildlife, haphazard growth of urban areas and transportation systems, 
increased congestion in our cities, and intolerable noise levels. 
Jackson, supra at 1073. 
Efforts to gain congressional recognition of the problems presented by our deteriorating 
environment were not immediately successful. Prior to NEPA, several bills stressing en-
vironmental concerns were introduced. Among these were the Resources and Conserva-
tion Act, S. 2549, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1969), and the Ecological Research and Surveys 
Act, S. 2282, 89t}l Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For a discussion of the movement supporting 
environmental legislation in the 1960's, see R. Shelton, The Environmental Era: A 
Chronological Guide to Policy and Concepts, 1962-72 (1973) (unpublished dissertation, 
Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y.). 
• Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-4361 (1976)). 
•. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter cited as NEPA], §§ 101-
102(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332(1) (1976), setting out Congress' goals for environmental 
protection and providing that "to the fullest extent possible: . . . the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in ac-
cordance with the policies" of NEPA. NEPA, § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1). 
' As used in this article, "agency" applies to both independent regulatory bodies and 
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establishing procedures for implementing those policies.5 Many 
of those who had hoped that NEPA would help arrest or control 
the degradation of the environment feel, however, that the 
NEPA process has not met their expectations.6 
One of Congress' primary goals in passing NEPA was to make 
agency decisionmakers aware of future demand for our nation's 
natural resources. The procedural provisions of the Act were in-
tended to promote that objective. Until recently, however, 
NEPA has primarily provided environmentalists and non-envi-
ronmentalists alike a tool with which to delay federal projects by 
challenging the adequacy of enviromental impact statements. 7 
The Act has enabled the former group to forestall, but rarely 
prevent, interference with the earth's ecological balance8 and en-
abled the latter to achieve short-term non-environmental ends.' 
The NEPA process must do more if the realignment of national 
policies that the Act purports to achieve•0 is to be realized. 
Two commentators have described NEPA and its most notable 
requirement, the preparation of environmental impact state-
parts of the executive branch. 
• NEPA, § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976). The most important provision of § 
102(2) is § 102(2)(C), which requires the preparation of what has come to be called an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 
Political forecasters were uncertain what impact the Act would have upon the workings 
of the federal government. Since 1969, the ramifications of NEPA have been reviewed 
,and assessed periodically by commentators, see, e.g., F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 
(1973), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), see, e.g., CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL 
QuALITY-1978, an annual report discussing the year's developments in environmental 
fields, and Congress, see, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DMSION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS 
(1973). 
• See Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It 
Should Work, [1974] 4 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10003; Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About 
NEPA, 26 OKL. L. REv. 239 (1973). In this article, the phrase "NEPA process" will refer 
to the fulfillment of the Act's procedural requirements in light of its substantive policies. 
7 R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 158-60. 
' See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The Court upheld the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 
informal rulemaking procedures for determining environmental effects of fuel reproces-
sing. Despite the Court's holding, the Vermont Yankee litigation lasted four years and 
thus forestalled the environmental damage feared by the public interest plaintiffs. See 
also note 51 supra. 
' See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 455 
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (NEPA applicable to termination of federal helium conserva-
tion contract). Though the government contract in question was ultimately terminated, 
the government purchased $30 million worth of unwanted helium during the litigation. 
Wall St. J., June 9, 1978, at 25, col. 3. See also Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975) (injunction sought by area residents against proposed 
low income housing project, claiming inadequacy of EIS prepared by Department of 
Housing and Urban Development). 
IO 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1976). 
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ments, as a "built in mechanism for leading the bureaucratic 
horses to environmental waters." 11 To a great extent, however, 
the federal government's shortcomings in implementing NEPA's 
policies result from agency decisionmakers' failure to utilize in-
formation prepared pursuant to the Act in fomulating their 
decisions. 
NEPA, in its most potent form, could be a powerful tool for 
controlling the threat that advanced technology poses to our en-
vironment.12 Today, improved technology also provides means to 
control that threat}3 If utilized properly, the EIS can provide an 
avenue by which methods of environmental protection will be 
implemented. ' 
In a step toward utilizing the potential of EIS's, President 
Carter ordered in May of 1977 that the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ) promulgate regulations for the preparation 
and use of EIS's which would be binding on federal agencies. 14 In 
the resulting regulations, the CEQ has attempted to transform 
the NEPA process so as to ensure the serious consideration of 
environmental values currently lacking in federal 
decisionmaking. 15 
11 Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureau-
cracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 515 (1972). 
12 E. DOI.GIN &·T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 435. See also Technology Assessment Act 
of 1972, 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-481 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) . 
.. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TEcHNOWGY: PROCESSES OF AssESSMENT AND CHOICE 
11-12 (1969) ("[A]dvances in science and technology have brought advances in our ability 
to anticipate the secondary and tertiary consequences of contemplated technological de-
velopments .... For the first time in human history [mankind can] realistically aspire 
to have it both ways: to maximize our gains [from technology] while minimizing our 
[environmental] losses."). 
" Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977) (amending Exec. Order No. 
11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970)). Prior to the President's call for action, CEQ published 
a report which, contrary to its own statements in the supplementary materials accompa-
nying its new guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 2 (1978), and its ninth annual report, 
CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY-1978, 396-97, reflected positively on the adjustment of 
federal agencies to NEPA's requirements and the use of EIS's in decisionmaking. The 
optimism portrayed in these materials is inconsistent with other authority on NEPA. 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS-AN ANALYSIS 
OF Six YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES (1976) (hereinafter cited as 1976 
REPORT). 
The new guidelines took effect on July 30, 1979. Prior to this time, CEQ's advisory 
guidelines were in effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1-1500.14 (1978). 
In the light of the acknowledgement in the statement accompanying Exec. Order No. 
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978), that the President may not be able to bind indepen-
dent regulatory agencies, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,760 (1978), it is unclear whether CEQ or the 
President have the authority so to bind independent federal agencies by these regula-
tions. It should be noted that NEPA itself purports to apply to all federal agencies. 42 
u.s.c. § 4332(2) (1976). 
" In order to gain acceptance for its new guidelines, CEQ has attempted, to a great 
extent, to respond to prior judicial interpretations of NEPA. Throughout this article, ref-
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This article will examine the new regulations to assess the 
manner in which they will affect federal decisionmaking. Part I 
briefly reviews the role the NEPA process has heretofore played 
in agency decisionmaking and its potential for the future. Parts 
II, III, and IV discuss specific provisions of the new regulations 
which may profoundly affect the agencies. Part II examines those 
sections of the regulations which seek to ensure that the EIS 
contains the substantive information necessary to fulfill NEPA's 
policies. Part III discusses significant procedural changes in the 
environmental assessment process designed to insure that this 
substantive information is considered by agency decisionmakers. 
Part IV examines provisions which seek to guarantee that agency 
decisions subsequent to the preparation of the EIS actually re-
flect the information it contains. The article concludes that 
CEQ's initiative will greatly promote the policies of NEPA. 
I. NEPA-PAST AND FUTURE 
When NEPA was enacted it was hailed as a "window to the 
outside world," 18 opening previously closed aspects of the admin-
istrative process to public scrutiny and comment, thus forcing 
more considered and informed decisionmaking. The EIS was 
viewed by many as the Act's most important feature. 17 In prac-
tice, however, NEPA procedures have not had a profound impact 
upon agency decisionmaking. Two problems have plagued the 
Act's effectiveness. First, while the procedural provisions of sec-
tion 102(2)18 are clearly binding on all federal agencies, and the 
courts have rarely hestiated to order strict compliance with these 
requirements, 19 judges have been reluctant to reverse agency de-
erences will be made to court decisions with which the new guidelines are in accord. 
The requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1979), for example, echo the discussion of the 
information required in an EIS in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding an EIS inadequate). The court there emphasized that 
NEPA's requirement is broader than· the mere filing of an EIS and that the preparer of 
the EIS must provide ample data and reasoning to enable a reader to evaluate the analy-
sis and conclusions of the EIS. Id. at 93. 
11 Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516-17. 
17 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 1079. · 
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Section 102(2)(C) contains NEPA's "action-forcing" 
provision for the preparation of an EIS for "major federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment." The statement, under the Act, must include (i) 
the projected environmental impact of a proposed action, (ii) unavoidable adverse envi-
ronmental impacts, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between 
local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources associated with the proposed action. Id. 
11 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 
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cisions for failure to comport with the policy declarations of sec-
tions 101 and 102(1).20 Second, when not under judicial scrutiny, 
agencies have been recalcitrant in fulfilling the procedural obli-
gations imposed by the Act. The latter problem prompted Presi-
dent Carter to order the promulgation of the new regulations. 21 
A. The Administrative Process and National Environmental 
Policy 
The policies set out in sections 101 and 102(1) of NEPA theo-
retically became part of the statutory mandate of each federal 
agency;22 thus, consideration of environmental protection should 
enter into the deliberations of all federal agencies. Agencies, 
however, have remained loyal to their original statutory mis-
sions23 in formulating decisions, becoming, in effect, part of the 
environmental problem rather than part of its solution.24 While 
there has been pro forma compliance with the procedural re-
quirements of section 102(2), information obtained through the 
environmental assessment process has rarely been translated 
into decisions which take account of national environmental pol-
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the leading early case on NEPA. 
,. See, e.g., Pye v. Dep't of Transportation, 513 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanner 
v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972). But see Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972). 
21 President Carter intimated that he believes NEPA creates a substantive obligation 
on the part of federal agencies when, in the authorization for the new guidelines, he 
stated that the Act was legislative recognition of the need for decisionmakers "to focus on 
real environmental issues." Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). While his 
assessment does not legally bind the agencies, it is of great political significance. The 
general terms of the Act leave much room for executive interpretation. Thus, the views of 
the President are likely to be quite influential in shaping the implementing regulations 
which wed federal agencies to a particular interpretation of the Act. 
12 NEPA, § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1976). The court in Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 
677, 689 (9th Cir. 1974), stressed that "(e]nvironmental protection is part of every federal 
agency's mandate." NEPA, if faithfully followed, could diminish the "fragmentation of 
... purposes and values among [the) disparate, mission oriented groups" in the federal 
government. R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5. 
23 Andrews terms this problem one of "jurisdictional externalities," i.e., "values that · 
are neglected in administrative decisions because they .fell outside the jurisdiction of the 
agency responsible for an action." R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5. 
i. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute For Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Atomic Energy Commission failed to prepare 
EIS in connection with liquid metal fast breeder reactor program); Monroe County Con-
servation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972) (court termed Secretary 
of Transportation's action under NEPA as "mere token efforts."); Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Secretary of the Interior 
argued that discussion of alternatives mandated by NEPA did not have to include dis-
cussion of environmental impacts of such alternatives); Akers v. Resor, 443 F. Supp. 1355 
(W.D. Tenn. 1978) (Corps of Engineers failed to discuss environmental impacts of flood 
and drainage program in EIS). 
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1c1es and goals.25 Courts have repeatedly found it necessary to 
remind agencies that an EIS may not be used to justify a deci-
sion formulated prior to its preparation.26 
The agencies' shunning of environmental values is a function 
of two common features of the federal bureaucracy. First, agen-
cies can be effective only if they can mobilize political support 
for their legislatively created roles.27 The federal bureaucracy op-
erates on a reward system; it is dependent upon "political basis 
for its survival and growth."28 It is in an agency's interest to be 
responsive to its most powerful constitutents, most often those 
involved in industry and business, 29 thus retaining the support of 
those constituents' lobbies. 
Second, because agency action is ultimately that of the indi-
viduals who constitute the agency, an agency's reluctance to im-
plement NEPA's substantive policies is due in part to the atti-
tudes of those individuals.30 While an abstract concept of the 
"organization" does not control each choice of a decisionmaker, 
it does provide the official with the values premises upon which 
those choices are based.31 The particular values imparted by a 
federal agency to its personnel are an outgrowth of the mission it 
was created to fulfill. This phenomenon is dictated by the educa-
tional background of the agency's staff members,32 the relation-
11 Supplementary Information to Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 2 (1978). 
See generally E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note l, at 443-57. 
" See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 276-79 (W.D. Wash. 1972) ("The envi-
ronmental impact study may not 'be used as a promotional document in favor of the 
proposal.'" Id. at 276 (footnote omitted)). 
27 Long, Power and Administration, 9 Pus. AD. REv. 257 (1949), reprinted in BUREAU· 
CRATIC PoWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 5, 8 (2d ed. F. Rourke, 1972). 
ZS Id. 
21 It has also been suggested that agencies may fail to respond to NEPA so as not to 
alienate their congressional constituents whose interests are in non-environmental areas. 
R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 82 (1976). 
30 It has been suggested that bureaucrats' perspectives are molded by their individual 
responses to the stimuli provided by the agency. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 123 
(1957). 
"Id. 
"' Most agency personnel, even those involved with the preparation of EIS's, have nar-
row perspectives, Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516; an agency's "professional staffs 
normally included only the range of disciplines necessary to the fulfillment of [their] par-
ticular missions," R. ANDREWS, supra note l, at 4. See 1976 REPoRT, supra note 14, at 5-
10, for a general discussion and data concerning agency NEPA offices. 
One critic of agency efforts to comply with NEPA has pointed out that the traditional 
mission-oriented agency does not have a staff qualified to prepare EIS's because its mem-
bers are unfamiliar with environmental concerns and sciences. Strobehn, NEPA 's Impact 
on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Non-Compliance and Suggestions for Change, 4 
EcoL. L.Q. 93, 102 (1974); accord, 1976 RuoRT, supra note 14, at 11; cf. Frederickson, 
Public Administration in the 1970's: Deuelopments and Directions, 36 Pus. Ao. REv. 564, 
565 (1976) ("Most public servants ... identify with some ... professional field."). 
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ships they develop with the agency's constituents, and their con-
stant striving to perform the agency's statutory mission. 33 In the 
context of NEPA, agency personnel resist implementing the 
Act's policy declarations because these policies run counter to 
the values that have been instilled in them by their agency. 34 
B. Stricter Enforcement of NEPA Through CEQ's New 
Regulations 
The focus of the CEQ's new regulations is on procedures to be 
employed in preparing an EIS. Ultimately, however, it is not 
better environmental documents, but decisions which take ac-
count of environmental values, that are important. 35 Procedural 
reforms alone will not change the substantive direction of agency 
policies38 if agencies continue to resist applying NEPA's precepts 
to their decisions.37 Combatting agency resistance is a difficult 
task since the agencies are well insulated from outside influence. 
The regulations can erode this insulation in three ways. First, 
while the public has heretofore been a primary source of NEPA 
The extensive requirements of the new regulations may cause agencies either to de-
velop or acquire special personnel to prepare their EIS's. If the regulations do induce 
agencies to hire staff members with greater environmental consciousness and analytic 
expertise than those currently preparing EIS's, two changes could result. First, the quali-
ty of the information in EIS's might improve. Second, the agencies' perspective might be 
broadened and their orientation might shift, causing greater consideration of and defer-
ence to environmental values. See Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516. 
13 One commentator described the nexus between NEPA and the identity of agency 
mission, and agency staff orientation, stating that the Act was designed to enable agency 
staff members to "overcome, through study and discussion, anti-environmental biases 
resulting from inertia and ignorance." Comment, The National Environmental Policy 
Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 799, 816 (1973) . 
.. The draft guidelines were not well received by federal agencies which, among other 
things, felt they betrayed a lack of "appreciation of bureaucratic reality." Comment, 
CEQ Proposes Ambitious Regulations for Comment, Stands Ground Despite Agency 
Criticism, [1978) 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10129, 10130. 
u 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(C) (1979) . 
.. Comment, Reinvigorating the NEPA Process: CEQ's Draft Compliance Regulations 
Stir Controversy, [1978) 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELR) 10045, 10046. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 
Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977), authorizing these guidelines, limits the authorization to "[issu-
ing) regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions 
of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2))." Id. (emphasis added). This raises the question of 
whether the provisions of the guidelines which potentially have substantive impact are 
within the ambit of the executive order. See parts II & IV infra. 
17 It has been suggested that agencies can adapt themselves to changing social values 
through internal reorganization in one of two ways-either by a change in agency struc-
ture, see F. MOSHER, GoVERNMENTAL REoRANIZATIONS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (1976), or a 
change in agency personnel, Frederickson, supra note 32, at 565-66. One commentator 
suggests that agencies may lack the resources required for such institutional reforms. R. 
LIRoFF, supra note 29, at 83. 
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enforcement, 38 certain provisions of the new regulations facilitate 
even greater enforcement by the public as lobbyists as well as 
litigants.39 Second, until now, courts reviewing EIS's have been 
restricted to applying the standard of review set out in section 
706(2)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act.4° Courts will now 
impose upon federal agencies the concrete requirements set forth 
by CEQ. Third, while they remain capable of nullifying Con-
gress' environmental mandate communicated through NEPA, 
agency decisionmakers may become more amenable to accepting 
the Act's precepts. The more often a decisionmaker is confronted 
with the projections in an EIS and the subsequent realization of 
those projections, the greater the probability that he or she will 
begin to take greater heed of the document. 
The new guidelines modify existing NEPA procedures in two 
general ways. First, they particularize or alter procedures which 
are generally followed by most agencies. Second, they add inno-
vative procedures intended to improve EIS's and compel agen-
cies to utilize them in decisionmaking. Frequently, provisions in 
the latter category will have some basis in case law or literature, 
though they are not presently common practice in most agencies. 
38 See notes 183-205 and accompanying text infra. A Senate report concluded that, 
through attempts to enforce NEPA in the courts, the public has been the most effective 
champion of the environmental cause, the principal force driving NEPA's implementa-
tion. R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 154, citing S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969). 
There have been various types of public organizations involved in NEPA litigation. 
One such type consists of national or regional public interest organizations such as the 
Sierra Club, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1970), and the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, NRDC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). Another 
type includes local civic and environmental groups. Examples are 1.M.A.G.E. of Greater 
San Antonio, Texas, Image v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978), and the Conservation 
Society of Southern Vermont, Inc., Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transportation, 
531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). Finally, some NEPA litigation has been initiated by groups 
formed for the sole purpose of combatting a single government action. Such organizations 
include the Stop H-3 Association, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii), 
and Save Our Ten Acres, Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). 
While citizen suits have not altered many individual decisions, they have been instru-
mental in raising the environmental consciousness of agency staff members. Environmen-
tal protection statutes passed subsequent to NEPA have often specifically provided for 
citizen suits. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1977, § 129, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II 
1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(1976); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 413, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976); and Safe Drinking 
Water Act, § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1976). 
•• For example, through the record of decision, see part IV B infra, the public will be 
afforded even greater access than previously to information concerning the agencies' 
treatment of environmental values and thus an even better opportunity to challenge 
agency actions which ignore environmental concerns. 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). Judicial review of administrative determinations is gener-
ally limited to the standards in this section. Agency decisions are not normally review-
able de novo by the courts. 
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II. ASSURING THE INCLUSION OF SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION IN THE 
EIS 
The most essential step in attaining acceptance of environ-
mental policies is to make certain that federal decisionmakers 
are aware of the harm their agencies' actions may cause. Con-
gress established the EIS to present decisionmakers with this in-
formation. On the whole, however, NEPA's description of the 
substantive information to be included in an EIS is ambiguous 
and disjointed." Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which provides for 
the preparation of an EIS for "all major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the human environment," lists five general sub-
jects to be addressed in the statement.•2 In addition, NEPA 
mandates that all federal agencies consider (1) "the natural and 
social sciences and the environmental design arts,"43 (2) "pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities,"•• (3) "appropriate 
alternatives to recommended courses of action,"45 and (4) "eco-
logical information. "48 Thus, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise 
data which should be included in an EIS. 
General interpretations of NEPA's requirements for the con-
tent of EIS's have been consistent. The prevailing judicial inter-
pretation is that NEPA requires the information included in an 
EIS to be of sufficient depth to provide the agency with a basis 
" An effort to remedy the Act's skeletal treatment of this question was made in 1973 
when Senator Weicker of Connecticut introduced a bill which, if it had been enacted, 
would require that an EIS discuss: 
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, together with the im-
pact of the proposed action on the economic, social, and cultural dimensions 
which contribute to the quality of the human environment, 
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, along with any opposing considerations of national 
policy as set forth in Section 102(2)(B) which are used to justify implementation 
of such proposal, 
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, including the reasons, environmen-
tal, social, or economic, for rejection of such alternatives, 
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would 
be involved in the proposed action, should it be implemented, and that any such 
commitments are warranted in terms of balancing policy considerations as set 
forth in Section 102(2)(B). 
S. 1668, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (proposed amendments to the Act are in italics). 
" See note 18 supra. 
" NEPA, § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1976). 
" Id. § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976). 
•• Id. § 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976). A discussion of alternatives is also 
required under NEPA, § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976), as part of the 
EIS. See part Il B infra. 
" NEPA, § 102(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1976). 
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for a reasoned decision.47 Courts, however, have been unable to 
offer a comprehensive statement of the specific issues which 
should be addressed in an EIS; they are generally confronted 
with an EIS deficient in certain particulars but otherwise proce-
durally adequate. Similarly, no binding regulations, except those 
prepared by individual agencies, have heretofore existed. 48 
The new guidelines contain several provisions which attempt 
to assure that all relevant and necessary information concerning 
the environmental effects of major federal actions is evaluated 
by decisionmakers.49 Some of these provisions enumerate, with-
out much elaboration, items which are normally included in an 
EIS.50 Three provisions, however, stand out as particularly sig-
nificant in precipitating greater adherence to NEPA's policies. 
A. Scoping 
Due to the paucity of statutory guidance concerning the con-
tent of EIS's, agencies have repeatedly failed to discuss certain 
relevant considerations while dealing with others that are insig-
nificant concerning a particular project. The byproducts of such 
breakdowns in planning have been excessive and protracted liti-
gation, 51 unnecessary expenditure of agency resources, 52 and de-
47 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Morton, 458 F.Supp. 827, 836 
(D.C.Cir. 1972). 
48 See, e.g., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Protection and Enhance-
ment of Environmental Quality, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,182 (1973). 
" For the purposes of this part, it will be assumed that the purely procedural sections 
of the new guidelines, discussed in part ID infra, are followed, and that the EIS is availa-
ble to decisionmakers at the appropriate stage in the decisionmaking process. In practice, 
the EIS may not, however, be available until a later date. See notes· 110-24 and accompa-
nying text infra . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1979), for example, contains an exhaustive list of different im-
pacts and resource requirements of a proposed action that must be discussed in an EIS. 
The Council stated in its discussion of comments on the draft guidelines that the re-
quired analysis concerning costs and benefits related to exhaustion of energy resources is 
intended to be extensive, Supplementary Information to Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 
at 55, 984, col. 1 (1978) (comments on § 1502.15). 
0• The volume of NEPA litigation was greatest in 1974 when 189 cases were filed. There 
were at least one hundred NEPA suits filed through 1977. CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY-
1978 407-15. An example of a drawn out NEPA case is the litigation culminating with the 
dismissal in Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
which lasted over four years, including the case of Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. 
Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and rem 'd, 523 F.2d 
88 (2d Cir. 1975). See also note 8 supra. 
sz CEQ recognized this problem prior to the President's Exec. Order No. 11,991. One of 
the major conclusions of the 1976 REP<>RT, which was designed to determine the effective-
ness of EIS's in improving decisionmaking, was that the CEQ and the agencies must 
"extend efforts ... to determine the appropriate scope of analysis" in EIS's. 1976 RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 4, 25. 
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lay of important projects. To avert these problems, CEQ has de-
veloped provisions requiring interagency cooperation in pre-EIS 
planning procedures.53 One of these procedures is aimed at iden-
tifying, at an early stage, the information which is important in 
evaluating a particular project. This process has been termed 
"scoping. "54 
The regulations first provide that "there shall be an early and 
open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed 
in the EIS and for identifying the significant issues related to a 
proposed action."55 Scoping also includes specific planning for 
the preparation of the EIS, 58 including allocating responsibility 
for particular sections to the various agencies participating in its 
preparation.57 The lead agency58 is to invite federal, state, and 
local agencies, any affected Indian tribe, the proponent of the 
proposed action, and other interested parties to participate in 
the scoping process. 59 
One danger associated with interagency cooperation on a given 
project is that the institutional biases of the various agencies 
may only confuse the decisionmaker, who will be presented with 
information from a variety of inconsistent perspectives. The 
scoping requirement alleviates this problem to a great extent by 
providing for an exchange of ideas prior to the preparation of the 
EIS. This should enable lead and cooperating80 agencies to inte-
grate and evaluate data developed by other agencies, being cog-
nizant of the other agencies' priorities and what they view as the 
primary benefits and dangers of the proposed action.81 
Objections have been raised concerning the time-consuming 
13 One significant change that the new guidelines introduce into the NEPA process is a 
formalized set of procedures for interagency cooperation in each step of the EIS prepara-
tion process. See part II C infra. The statutory language does not mandate the extensive 
cooperation established by CEQ, but it implies that some cooperation should take place. 
NEPA, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), states that the preparer of the EIS 
"shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved" with 
a proposed action. Apparently, the new guidelines' provisions for interagency cooperation 
in EIS preparation are rooted in this sketchy statutory language. To effectively imple-
ment the Act, CEQ has required formal cooperation, not mere consultation. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1979). 
"Id. 
11 Id. § 1501.7(a)(2)-(7) . 
., Id. § 1501. 7(a)( 4). 
51 See id. § 1501.5: "A lead agency shall supervise the preparation of an environmental 
impact statement if more than one Federal agency [is involved in the proposed action]." 
" Id. § 1501.7(a)(l). 
'° See id. § 1501.6. A "cooperating agency" is any agency besides the lead agency 
which is involved in preparing an EIS. 
11 Alternatively, it is possible that one agency may improperly discount information 
from another agency because of what it perceives are biases of that agency. 
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nature of the scoping process. The CEQ, however, believes that 
any disruption of the decisionmaking process will be insignifi-
cant and that scoping will sufficiently enhance the efficiency of 
the NEPA process to justify the expenditure of time.82 While ad-
ministrative economy is a laudable objective, it should not be-
come an ultimate goal, especially at the expense of comprehen-
sive decisionmaking. 
A potential flaw in the scoping technique is that it will cause a 
cursory treatment of the issues by diffusing the energies availa-
ble for EIS preparation. When agencies with divergent orienta-
tions debate which questions are relevant to a particular project, 
their diverse backgrounds will· beget diverse priorities. Com-
promises could well produce an EIS addressing so many issues 
that none can be developed adequately if the statement is to be 
prepared in accordance with CEQ's page limitations.83 It is also 
possible, however, that scoping will result in an EIS which re-
flects the many values of a pluralistic society and which helps 
reach decisions which do the same. In view of the adolescent 
character of environmental sciences, a sacrifice of detail in ex-
change for broadened perspectives may be beneficial in the short 
run if it serves to familiarize agencies with the nature and range 
of environmental problems their actions might cause. 
· It should be emphasized that environmental considerations 
will not necessarily be accorded their due weight simply because 
of interagency cooperation or because scoping ensures that the 
EIS will contain the proper information. Such cooperation will, 
however, permit those decisionmakers who are responsive to en-
vironmental concerns to protect the environment while achieving 
other objectives by making necessary information available to 
them. In sum, the formal organization and planning of EIS prep-
aration through scoping will allow "more timely, coordinated, 
and efficient review of (proposed actions)."84 
B. Alternatives to the Proposed Action 
One clear NEPA requirement is that agencies must consider 
alternatives to a proposed action, whether or not an EIS is pre-
12 Supplementary Information to Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,982, col.2 
(1978). 
13 "The text of final environmental statements . . . shall normally be less than 150 
pages and for proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall normally be less than 300 
pages." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (1979). 
" Supplementary Information on Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,982, col. 1 
(1978), comments on § 1501.7. p 
WINTER 1980] New CEQ Regulations 379 
pared.85 The discussion of alternatives has been termed the 
"heart" of the EIS" because it provides agency decisionmakers 
with information about the environmental impacts of a range of 
concrete avenues for achieving the agency's objective, rather 
than merely revealing the environmental effects of the proposed 
action. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 87 the 
authoritative interpretation of the alternatives requirement, 88 the 
court addressed three important aspects of the treatment of al-
ternatives in an EIS: the range of alternatives discussed, the ex-
tent to which each alternative is evaluated, and the standard for 
judicial review. Under Morton, the alternatives considered must 
include the alternative of no action, 89 methods of achieving the 
objective sought that are outside the jurisdiction of the agency 
preparing the statement,70 and methods which may not com-
pletely achieve that objective.71 The discussion of each alterna-
tive must provide "information sufficient to permit a reasoned 
choice [among] alternatives so far as the environmental effects 
[of each] are concerned."72 Finally, the case established a rule of 
reason for determining whether an impact statement discusses 
all appropriate alternatives to the proposed action.73 
The applicable CEQ regulations are consistent with judicial 
interpretations of the alternatives requirement.74 Section 1502.14 
details the method for discussing alternatives in an· EIS. Gener-
ally, the agencies must "[r]igorously explore and objectively 
evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and . . . briefly discuss the 
.. NEPA, §§ 102(2)(C)(iii), (E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii), (E) (1976). Only § 
102(2)(C) of NEPA applies to the preparation of EIS's. Thus, § 102(2)(E), along with the 
other subsections of § 102(2), must be complied with in some form of environmental 
assessment document whether or not § 102(2)(C) is triggered. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1979). 
" 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
11 For '<ases citing Morton es the authoritative treatment of the issue of alternatives, 
see Cummington Preservation Comm. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 524 F.2d 241, 244 (1st 
Cir. 1975); Caroline Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 798 
(D.C. Dir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway), 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conservation 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1972). 
11 458 F. 2d at 834. 
10 Id. at 834-35 . 
. " Id. at 836. 
" Id. at 836. 
" Id. at 834.' 
" 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1979). In promulgating § 1502.14, CEQ was evidently cognizant 
of prior case law. See note 15 supra. The Council's concern that this part receive the 
complete sanction of the courts is attributable to CEQ's view that this section is the most 
important in the EIS. See text accompanying note 66 supra. 
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reasons [others] hav[e] been eliminated."75 Each alternative 
must be sufficiently detailed to allow decisionmakers to evaluate 
its comparative merits.78 The range of alternatives explored 
should not be limited to those within the jurisdiction of the 
agency preparing the EIS if options outside its jurisdiction are 
viable, and must include the possibility that no action should be 
taken.77 Finally, the agency is to identify its preferred alternative 
and include appropriate measures for mitigating environmental 
harm that have not already been developed and included as part 
of the proposed action or an alternative thereto.78 
Section 1502.14 of the regulations enhances decisionmaking in 
several ways. First, treating all reasonable alternatives to a pro-
posed action should facilitate better decisions. NEPA has been 
interpreted to require agencies to balance the costs and benefits 
of a proposed action in a "finely tuned and 'systematic' balanc-
ing analysis. " 79 Assessment of the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of a particular course of action should be affected by 
the potential environmental harm from possible alternatives. 
Thus, the best choice is more readily determined when all rea-
sonable alternatives are examined in the EIS.80 
Second, the elaborate discussion of alternatives required by 
sections 1502.14(a) and 1502.14(b) is important in assuring that 
the decisionmaking process becomes "finely tuned." If agencies 
do not develop data about alternatives as extensively as they do 
for the original proposal, an adequate basis for comparison may 
not exist. It is imperative that when any information is available 
to decisionmakers concerning a proposed action, equivalent in-
formation about the possible alternative be provided as well. 
Third, when a decisionmaker is provided with more compre-
hensive information on a given alternative than on others, the 
decision could be prejudiced in favor of that alternative. If the 
decisionmaker is better able to perceive the ultimate result of 
more than one alternative he or she may be less likely to choose 
a course of action with a more speculative impact. 81 
75 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1979) (emphasis added). 
71 Id. § 1502.14(b). 
77 Id. § 1502.14(c)-(d). While § 1502.14(c) refers specifically to the jurisdiction of the 
lead agency, see note 59 supra, it is evidently the intention of CEQ that agencies beside 
the lead agency be involved in the preparation of the EIS (see §§ 1501.5-1501.6). Thus, § 
1502.14(c) will be discussed here as if the terms "lead" and "preparing" were 
interchangeable. 
1• Id. § 1502.14(e)-(O. 
71 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
80 Id. at 1114. 
• 1 See part II C infra. 
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The requirements in sections 1502.14(c) and 1502.14(d) should 
broaden the approach of agencies in considering alternatives. 
The requirement of section 1502.14(c) that an EIS consider alter-
natives outside the jurisdiction of the preparing agency is signifi-
cant because it recognizes that environmental problems tran-
scend the sometimes artificial jurisdictional lines of agencies and 
emphasizes that the CEQ believes these lines must be ignored 
in combatting environmental harm. Furthermore, section 
1502.14(d) provides that an agency must include the "no action" 
alternative in the EIS; while an agency may have almost com-
pletely abandoned the "no action" alternative in the earliest 
· stages of project development, it is important to reassess the wis-
dom of proceeding when more facts are available. 
A particularly significant requirement is that preparers of an 
EIS include environmental mitigation measures. Previously, 
when a proposed action or alternative was developed, it may 
have ignored mitigation measures because those who formulated 
the alternative lacked familiarity with environmental matters 
and means of minimizing environmental harm.82 
While the comprehensive study of alternatives is a laudable 
goal, several of the specific requirements in the guidelines are 
subject to criticism. Initially, the requirement that agencies con-
sider alternatives outside their own jurisdiction presents three 
problems. The first is one of expertise; agency staffs cannot be 
expected to adequately develop alternatives outside their juris-
diction because they lack familiarity with other agencies' capa-
bilities. In extreme cases, the staff of one agency may be una-
ware of alternative methods utilized by other agencies. Though 
other agencies can be solicited to develop and evaluate alterna-
tives outside the preparing agency's jurisdiction, the former may 
be uninterested in the project. 83 Such an agency may not make a 
good faith effort to present the alternative completely and objec-
tively, 84 and thus the information it supplies decisionmakers may 
not provide a suitable basis for a reasoned decision. 
Second, it appears that cooperating agencies are expected to 
finance the development and assessment of an alternative 
82 The inclusion of mitigation measures in the alternatives considered in an EIS may 
have a significant impact upon the ultimate agency decision. See part IV A infra. 
83 See R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5 . 
.. There is also some ambiguity concerning the rights and obligations of the agency 
which is not primarily responsible for the EIS. It is unclear whether an agency is obli-
gated to aid in the preparation of another agency's EIS or the responsibility a given 
agency would have if a decisionmaker in another agency were to determine that an alter-
native to a proposed action which required involvement of the former agency were the 
preferred alternative. 
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outside the preparing agency's jurisdiction.85 It is unrealistic to 
view the federal government as a monolith. Agencies vie for re-
sources from a limited pool, and are understandably reluctant to 
expend any of those resources developing project proposals for 
other agencies. 
Third, this provision may meet with agency nullification. 
Decisionmakers may be prejudiced against choosing a course of 
action that would fall either primarily or wholly outside the ju-
risdiction of their agencies. The agency which originally con-
ceives the project does so for specific reasons, including antici-
pated increase in prestige, desire to please constitutents, and 
personal interest of the agency staff or leaders. The agency is not 
likely to surrender jurisdiction over a project to another agency 
when it has a stake in completing that project itself. 
There is also a question of whether requiring the "no action" 
alternative is merely a paper concession to environmentalists, 
because that alternative may never be chosen. As noted above, 
once an agency decides to proceed with the planning of a project 
it has, in all likelihood, ruled out the no action alternative. 
Moreover, once a selection of alternatives has reached the deci-
sionmaker's hands, not only an EIS, but many other information 
and planning documents, have been produced, at great cost to 
the agency. Abandoning a project at this stage would constitute 
a significant financial loss. 88 
Finally, section 1502.14(e), regarding the identification of the 
agency's preferred alternative, is subject to three criticisms. 
First, it is somewhat impractical. If the EIS is to be prepared as 
part of a decisionmaking process, the agency's final determina-
tion cannot be identified therein. There is little chance of deter-
mining what the "agency's" preferred alternative is at a static 
point because decisionmakers' dispositions could be changing 
continuously. Second, identifying a preferred alternative in the 
EIS cannot further the objectives of NEPA. At that point, the 
EIS has not been considered by the decisionmaker; before the 
EIS is considered, the preferred alternative is irrelevant to its 
content. Third, singling out a specific "preferred" alternative 
may influence the decisionmaker's choice. If this subpart is 
merely aimed at indicating to the public which of the alterna-
tives considered in the EIS is the originally proposed action, the 
.. 40 C:-F.R. § 1501.6(b)(5) (1979) provides that a cooperating agency shall "[n]ormally 
use its own funds." At least in the case of an agency which has jurisdiction by law over a 
proposed action, participation as a cooperating agency is required upon request of the 
lead agency. Id. § 1501.6. 
81 See notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra. 
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language of the provision should be clarified. 
There is a general drawback of section 1502.14, though it does 
not vitiate the need for a thorough consideration of alternatives. 
The regulations are ambiguous as to what constitutes a wholly 
distinct alternative and what constitutes a variation of another 
alternative. Agencies are called upon to develop, explore, and 
evaluate "all reasonable alternatives" to a proposed action. This 
could place a severe burden on an agency in terms of time and 
money. For this reason, many courts have demonstrated flex-
ibility in reviewing agencies' selection of alternatives.87 A solu-
tion to this problem is to require that agencies initially make a 
good faith effort to research a reasonable range of alternatives 
rather than all possible alternatives.88 A decisionmaker could 
then require a closer analysis of the alternatives within that part 
of the spectrum presented in which he or she is most interested. 
Despite this criticism, section 1502.14 is a vital requirement and, 
if followed, should play a major role in assuring that deci-
sionmakers have the greatest possible amount of environmental 
information available. 
C. Unavailable and Incomplete Information 
Even when all relevant information is available, predictions in 
EIS's may be little more than "informed guesswork."89 Behav-
ioral political scientists are concerned that federal deci-
sionmakers often fail to take proper account of uncertainty. 90 
87 See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225,232 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 967 (1976) (HUD need only consider alternatives in site 
selection, not manner of accomplishing objective); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 60 
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975) (HUD need not consider alternatives 
suggested by members of public); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 
487 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973) (alternatives with substantially equivalent environmen-
tal effects may be discussed in a limited fashion); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 
460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (EIS need not consider alterna-
tives whose effect cannot reasonably be ascertained or whose implementation is remote or 
speculative.). 
88 See E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 387. 
•• Id. at 384. Three characteristics of NEPA contribute to this uncertainty. Generally, 
although early preparation of the EIS is essential if the statement is to play the desired 
role in the decisionmaking process, the greater the time lapse between the preparation of 
the EIS and the commencement of work on the project the more speculative its contents. 
More specifically, when an EIS is prepared for a project that is the first of its kind, it is 
unlikely that any degree of thoroughness can reduce the high degree of speculation. Fi-
nally, while "programmatic" EIS's, which evaluate the enviromental effects of broad gov-
ernment programs are important to agency environmental planning, the information 
they contain is, by design, less specific and comprehensive than the information in an 
EIS evaluating the impacts of a specific project. 
'° See J. KRuTILLA & A. FISHER, Tm: ECONOMICS Or NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 39 (1975). 
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This is a special concern in the environmental field where tech-
nology is still in a relatively primitive stage. 
While NEPA's delineation of what an EIS must contain is at 
best imprecise, the statute completely overlooks the possibility 
that potentially relevant information may be unavailable or cost-
prohibitive. Despite Congress' failure to address this problem in 
the statute, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
was well aware that man's understanding of the environmental 
impacts of his actions is limited.91 
Judicial reaction to the problem of information gaps in EIS's 
initially seemed inconsistent with other NEPA decisions. 92 The 
court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers 
(Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 93 however, set the tone for 
_consistent responses to the problem. The court there held that 
the Army Corps of Engineers was not required to launch a mas-
sive research effort for the sake of complying with NEPA, stating 
that such an undertaking would be beyond the scope of an EIS. 94 
Later cases have suggested two justifications for permitting an 
EIS merely to acknowledge gaps in its data. First, unavailability 
of information should not bring the wheels of government grind-
ing to a halt. In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interfor, 95 
the court stated that as long as federal agencies indicate that the 
presentation of certain information has been deferred they are 
not required fo engage in "crystal ball" speculation and that un-
certainty regarding environmental information cannot, by itself, 
forestall government action.96 
11 See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY Acr OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969); F. ANDERSON, supra 
note 5, at 256-57. 
12 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Cossatot River), 325 F. 
Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), Judge Eisele remanded the EIS to the Corps of Engineers to 
ascertain information excluded from ·the original EIS. When faced with obvious errors in 
the updated EIS upon rehearing, however, he held the EIS adequate because the errors 
were not included intentionally, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Cossatot River), injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 
1214 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
" 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (EIS challenged by environmental group held 
adequate when viewed as a whole). 
" Id. at 938-39. 
" 562 F.2d. 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (EIS prepared by 
Secretary of Interior for leasing of federally owned outer continental shelf for oil and gas 
exploration held adequate). 
" Id. at 1378. The court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 
79 (2d Cir. 1975) (EIS on dumping of polluted dredged spoil in Long Island Sound held 
inadequate because of failure to discover cumulative impact of dumping projects) agreed. 
The court stated, "A government agency cannot be expected to wait until a perfect solu-
tion of environmental consequences of a proposed action is devised before preparing and 
circulating an EIS." Id. at 88. 
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Another justification for permitting an EIS to acknowledge a 
gap in data is that it may be feasible to obtain the necessary 
information at a later point. In Sierra Club v. Morton97 the court 
approved the Departrhent of Interior's postponing detailed re-
search into the hazai-ds of geological conditions on the ocean 
floor until after granting oil and gas leases because the agency 
would retain control of the project. The court found the EIS rea-
sonable as a whole without this information.98 Similarly, in Suf-
folk County99 the co~rt considered whether it was "meaningfully 
possible" to develop the missing information at a later stage. too 
Thus, while Sierra Club v. Morton and Suffolk County are care-
ful to note that information may be omitted from an EIS only 
when the potential danger from such an omission will be consid-
ered at a later date, Suffolk County and NRDC v. Calaway 
strongly state that federal agencies need not be frozen in their 
tracks because information required by NEPA is unavailable, 
and that other national policy objectives can override an 
agency's inability to obtain environmental information in decid-
ing whether to proceed with a proposed action. tot 
CEQ has heeded these cases and included a provision in the 
guidelines aimed at ensuring that the decisionmaker is aware 
" 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975). 
" Id. at 827-28. The rule of reason was originally applied as a standard for EIS review 
in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). While the courts have acknowledged that filing supplemental statements will con-
stitute compliance with NEPA, not all courts have gone as far as Sierra Club v. Morton. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 
1972), the court held on remand that supplementary statements were inadmissable in a 
case considering the adequacy of an EIS if they were circulated among the agencies and 
were considered after the final decision. to go ahead with the project had been made. 
Accord, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 91-92 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton are not necessarily 
inconsistent. It appears implicit in Sierra Club's approval of supplemental statements 
that such statements be allowed only when the action in question can be stopped or 
environmental harm avoided after additional information is filed. But see Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), where the court 
refused to enjoin the construction of sewage treatment facilities while ordering the prepa-
ration of a supplemental EIS concerning the impact the facilities would have on shellfish. 
See also notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra. 
" 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977). 
100 Id. at 1378. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 
837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
1• 1 Courts have been particularly amenable to this suggestion in cases where informa-
tion is not available at the time the original statement is prepared. See Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (fact that informa-
tion on effect of sewage treatment facilities on shellfish was not available at time EIS was 
issued did not render it inadequate). 
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that possibly relevant information has not been included in the 
statement. Entitled "Incomplete or unavailable information," 
section 1502.22182 provides that an agency shall indicate the gaps 
which exist in the relevant information and the points at which 
scientific uncertainty impinges upon the completeness or accu-
racy of the EIS. That section also provides for obtaining the 
missing information if the cost of obtaining it is not dispropor-
tionate to its estimated value 103 or, if the cost is excessive, pre-
paring a "worst case" analysis104 indicating the worst environ-
mental harm the project could cause and the probability of such 
harm resulting. 105 By requiring such an analysis, the new guide-
lines have gone further than the authorities cited above. 106 
Heretofore, agencies have been reluctant to abandon projects 
on the basis of environmental costs identified in an EIS. 187 Be-
cause of its specificity, conspicuousness, and pessimism, the 
"worst case" analysis could conceivably induce greater concern 
with environmental protection on the part of decisionmakers. 
Despite the fact that these analyses would be framed in terms of 
probabilites, agencies may be less likely to take risks when the 
possible adverse effects of their actions become part of a review-
able public record. 108 While Congress envisioned that NEPA 
would make decisionmakers cognizant of the environmental 
ramifications of their choices, it did not intend to inhibit them to 
the point of foreclosing valuable agency action. Thus, the "worst 
case" analysis could hinder decision making in ways unforeseen 
by CEQ. 
III. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 
In its early years NEPA was often interpreted by the courts as 
merely imposing a procedure for assessing the environmental 
ramifications of agency action, 189 regardless of whether or not 
1• 2 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1979). 
103 Id. § 1502.22(a). 
UM Id. § 1502.22(b). 
103 The requirement of an assessment of the probability that the worst case will occur 
was added when comments on the draft guidelines expressed concern that an EIS which 
included a worst case analysis would unduly highlight the often remote possibility of 
adverse environmental consequences. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,984, col. 3 (1978), Com-
ments to § 1502.22. 
108 See notes 92-101 and accompanying text supra. 
107 Hill & Ortolano, NEPA 's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial 
Test, 18 NAT. REs. J. 285, 308 (1978). 
108 See notes 181-213 and accompanying text infra. 
109 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Gillman Dam), 325 
F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (while acknowledging that it might be more, court 
treated NEPA as an "environmental full discloure law"). 
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that assessment was used by decisionmakers. If the EIS is to 
play a significant role in decisionmaking under the new guide-
. lines, however, execution of CEQ's procedural requirements 
must take on greater significance. It is thus appropriate to ex-
amine some of the procedural provisions in the new guidelines 
which attempt to guarantee that decisionmakers utilize the in-
formation in the EIS. This part will discuss three crucial proce-
dural requirements of the new regulations: timing of the EIS, 
forestalling of agency action until the EIS is filed, and inter-
agency cooperation in the preparation of the EIS. It will also ex-
amine the secondary effects of the CEQ procedures. 
A. Timing 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA provides that the EIS "shall ac-
company the proposal through the existing agency review 
processes." 110 In addition, section 102(2)(H) states that federal 
agencies shall "utilize ecological information in the planning and 
development of research-oriented projects."111 Both sections indi-
cate that Congress anticipated that the EIS would be prepared 
at an early stage of a project evaluation and would accompany a 
proposal through agency decisionmaking channels. 112 Commenta-
tors have construed NEPA as imposing two general obligations 
on federal agencies: full disclosure concerning the environmental 
impact of proposed actions and balanced decisionmaking. 113 The 
proper parties must get the proper information at the proper 
time so that these obligations can be fulfilled.... . 
Unfortunately, EIS's have had "little relation to actual deci-
sionmaking on location, design, construction, and operation of 
the endeavor being studied." 115 This result is due in part to the 
fact that EIS's have invariably taken a long time to prepare and 
11
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
111 NEPA, § 102(2){H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1976) (emphasis added). It is arguable 
that this subsection does not require such information to be in an EIS. When an EIS is 
prepared, however, other forms of enviromental assessment are customarily foregone. 
Thus, the information comtemplated by § 102(2)(H) will usually come to a deci-
sionmaker via the EIS. See also Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the 
Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. REs. J. 339 (1976). 
'" See W. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 767 (1977) (NEPA's "purpose is to require 
consideration of environmental factors before project momentum is inesistable, before 
options are closed, and before agency commitments are set in concrete."). 
"' D'Amato & Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements Upon Agency Responsibility: 
A Prescriptive Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 195, 198 (1976). 
'" Id. at 199. 
11
• Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 339. In its 1976 REPORT, CEQ also concluded 
that existing training programs ignored the value of the EIS in decisionmaking. 1976 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. 
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often are not completed until decisions have in fact been made; 
the statements then become instruments for justifying rather 
than assessing projects. Tl}is use of EIS's is not only contrary to 
the statutory language but is also wasteful since it does not 
heighten the government's responsiveness to environmental 
threats. To remedy this problem, the CEQ promulgated section 
1502.5, 116 which provides that "an agency shall commence prepa-
ration of an environmental impact statement as close as possible 
to the time the agency is presented with a proposal . . . so that 
preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to 
be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal." 117 
This requirement of early preparation of the EIS is crucial to the 
effectiveness of the Act. 
Several courts have clearly mandated preparation of the EIS 
as early as possible. 118 There are, however, objections to this 
practice. First, the earlier the EIS is prepared the more likely it 
is to contain errors and speculative data. 119 Second, CEQ envi-
sions EIS's which include information on costs and benefits un-
related to purely environmental matters, 120 which calls for work 
by staff members other than those involved in the development 
of environmental data. Including and evaluating such non-envi-
ronmental information in an EIS depends on its timely develop-
ment by these other staff members, and thus, the filing of the 
EIS may be retarded. Staff members responsible for preparing 
the EIS have not, in the past, been forced to coordinate their 
efforts with those performing other functions within the agency. 
Precise coordination, therefore, may be a practical impossibility. 
· Coordinating the preparation of environmental and non-envi-
ronmental information so that both can be included in the EIS is 
of questionable value. The ultimate responsibility for balancing 
information lies not with the staff members who prepare an EIS 
but with the decisionmaker. Rather than imposing excessive pro-
Ill 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1979). 
"' Id. 
118 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d. 
1109, 1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 256 (W.D. Wash. 1972); 
Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
111 E. DoLGJN & T. CUILBERT, supra note 1, at 384. One court has pointed out that 
impact statements must be prepared "late enough in the (project] development process 
to contain meaningful information." Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. 
Atomic Energy Comm'n., 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agencies must set forth 
reasons when choosing not to prepare an EIS at a particular stage of program develop-
ment in order to facilitate judicial review of that decision). 
12• 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(b) (1979) states that an EIS shall include a discussion of the 
indirect environmental effects of a proposed action and alternatives. "Effects" are de-
fined as including aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, and social impacts. Id. § 1508.8. 
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cedural hurdles on agencies the EIS should be limited to envi-
ronmental assessment. In this form, the document can "serve 
practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking 
process. " 121 
The regulations leave the exact timing of an EIS to agency 
discretion. 122 Section 1501.8 establishes procedures for setting ex-
act time limits for EIS preparation and contains a non-exhaus-
tive list of considerations which may enter into that determina-
tion, including potential for environmental harm, the size of the 
proposed action, the state of the art of analytic techniques, and 
the consequences of delay. 123 Other factors that have been pro-
posed include the amount of information needed, whether there 
is a sound basis for the decision prior to preparing the EIS, 
whether there is a preconceived bias on the part of deci-
sionmakers, and whether there is adequate extra-agency 
participation. 12• 
B. Forestalled Action 
When the environmental costs of a project are not properly as-
sessed before detailed planning or work on a project proceeds, 
two problems commonly jeopardize the goal of environmental 
preservation. The first is the use ·of the "sunk cost" justification 
by agencies. 125 When an agency assumes that it will proceed with 
a proposal and invests resources in the project, the cost of aban-
doning that project becomes greater. Thus, for example, while a 
cost-benefit analysis of the project might demonstrate that the 
proposal should not be adopted when no work has been done, the 
inclusion of the agency's analysis expenditures as part of the pro-
ject cost may tip the balance in favor of continuing the project. 128 
The court in Keith v. Volpe 121 foreclosed any possible use of 
the sunk cost argument by the state of California. Despite the 
defendant's admission that land purchased for highway con-
struction might have to be resold if the project were abandoned, 
the court refused to approve the continued acquisition of land for 
the project, believing that the more the state government spent 
"' Id. § 1502.5. 
112 Id. § 1501.8. 
1
" Id. § 1501.8(b)(l). 
iu Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Level Deci-
sionmaking, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 799, 817 (1973). 
in Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 347. 
121 See E. DOI.GIN & T. GUILBERT, supra pote 1, at 385. 
in 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (state's purchasing of parcels of land for highway 
enjoined pending preparation of acceptable EIS). 
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on the project the harder it would be to abandon, even if the 
expenditures could be recouped. 128 
The second problem that results when an agency commences 
work without completing an environmental assessment is that 
staff members develop greater allegiance to a particular alterna-
tive or the project in general as the project advances. Conse-
quently, a complementary bias develops against any alternatives 
to the proposed action or entirely different projects for which the 
agency's resources might be utilized. 129 
These two problems require that adequate EIS's be prepared 
before any action is taken. Although the general problem of pre-
mature action has not arisen frequently in litigation, it has been 
at issue in a few cases. The court in Arlington Coalition on 
Transportation v. Volpe, 130 for example, enjoined a highway 
transportation project pending the filing of an EIS. 131 In Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 132 the court stated that section 
102(2) "makes the completion of an adequate research program a 
prerequisite to agency action." 133 
The new CEQ regulations 134 support their timing requirements 
with a provision prohibiting any environmentally deleterious ac-
tion 135 until the agency has issued a record of its decision ex-
plaining whether and why it will proceed with a particular pro-
ject.'38 Section 1506.l(a) precludes agency action which will 
either "have an adverse environmental impact," or "limit the 
1" Id. at 1355. See also Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii 
1972) (acquisition of right of way enjoined pending preparation of acceptable EIS). Rod-
gers has described the problem of agencies proceeding on a project prior to the comple-
tion of an adequate EIS as one of "project momentum." W. RoDGERS, supra note 112, at 
774. 
1" Comment, supra note 124, at 813. 
130 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972). 
1
•
1 Id. at 1330. 
132 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D C. 1971) (injunction against Secretary of Agriculture to pre-
vent use of pesticides in southern United States denied because department research pro-
gram was adequate). 
133 Id. at 1403. "The Act," the Hardin court continued, "envisions that program formu-
lation will be directed by research results rather than that research programs will be 
designed to substantiate programs already decided upon." Id. See also Greene County 
Planning Board v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1972) (it was error for 
Commission to conduct hearings on application for construction of high-voltage transmis-
sion line prior to filing of EIS); Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D. 
Hawaii 1972) (construction, right of way acquisition, and expenditure for design of high-
way enjoined pending preparation of adequate EIS.) 
1" 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (1979). 
1"' Id. § 1506.l(a) speaks of "action concerning the proposal." (emphasis added). Pre-
sumably, this provision applies to action directly related to the project such as construc-
tion and to ancillary actions such as clearing land which may cause environmental harm. 
138 See part IV B infra. 
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choice of reasonable alternatives," 137 before the agency issues the 
record of decision. The agency must also promptly notify any 
grant or license applicant who is known to be proceeding with 
work on a project prior to the record of decision that any mea-
sures necessary to protect the environment will be taken, despite 
the applicant's prior action. 138 Finally, proceeding with a project 
that is a component of a larger project, and thus the subject of 
an acceptable programmatic EIS, 139 is proscribed until the· record 
of decision on the individual project is issued, 140 though the sec-
tion permits preparatory action that does not affect the 
environment. 141 
Section 1506.l(d) does allow continued planning during the 
NEPA process by non-federal applicants for government permits 
or assistance. Such planning, though not directly conducted by 
the agency preparing the EIS, may involve consulting with or 
reporting to that agency. It could thus affect the attitudes of 
decisionmakers and cause them to develop prejudices in favor of 
the project as the original conception evolves into reality. 
Section 1506.l(b) states that when an agency is aware that a 
non-federal applicant is contemplating action, the "agency will 
take appropriate action to insure that the objectives and proce-
dures of NEPA are achieved." 142 In the context of section 1506.1, 
this provision appears to require any environmental harm caused 
by such an applicant to be rectified to the fullest extent possible. 
The regulations, however, do not state who is to bear the cost of 
necessary measures. In order to inhibit environmentally damag-
ing action by private actors, either the guidelines or agency regu-
lations143 should make clear that the responsible party, and not 
the government, will bear the cost of any unwarranted injury to 
the environment. It may also be advisable for agencies to condi-
tion the granting of licenses or acceptance of bids on the appli-
cant's forebearance from harming the environment. 
Enforcement of section 1506.l(b) may engender great costs to 
the federal government. CEQ does not indicate what constitutes 
'"' 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(a)(l), l(a)(2) (1979). 
138 Id. § 1506.l(b). 
"' A programmatic environmental impact statement is one that assesses the environ-
mental effects of a related series of actions. 
"
0 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(c) (1979). 
"' Id. § 1506.l(d). But see Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D. 
Hawaii 1972) (expenditure for design of highway enjoined pending preparation· of ade-
quate EIS). 
'" 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(b) (1979). 
143 Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1979), agencies are to promulgate any necessary 
supplementary procedures. 
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"appropriate action." It seems, however, that the agencies are 
not empowered to require certain measures that might be appro-
priate to correct or mitigate environmental harm. Most agencies, 
for example, could not find statutory authority for imposing fines 
on private individuals who damage the environment. 144 The 
agencies can exert some power over parties to whom they do 
grant aid, a contract, or a permit. If, however, the value of that 
which the government grants these parties is diminished by pen-
alties commensurate with any environmental harm caused by 
the recipient, the latter may withdraw the application and again 
be beyond the jurisdiction of the agency. In addition, it is of lit-
tle concern to the applicant if the agency itself incurs the cost of 
remedying damage caused by an applicant. The loss of a govern-
ment grant may serve as a deterrent to private parties damaging 
the environment, but the manner in which such harm is to be 
remedied once inflicted is a more significant and unclear 
problem. 
It is possible that by "appropriate action" in section 1506.l(b) 
CEQ contemplates resort to the judicial process. The issue of 
private action injurious to the environment prior to the govern-
ment's completion of a necessary EIS was addressed in Silva v. 
Romney. 145 In Silva, the district court enjoined the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development from granting a private de-
veloper funds to proceed with the construction of a federally 
funded housing project pending the preparation of an acceptable 
EIS. 148 The district court did not, however, enjoin the private de-
veloper from cutting down trees. 147 The circuit court affirmed the 
holding on the first point and, while not taking any definitive 
action, stated that the district court had the power under NEPA 
to enjoin the action of a private applicant for public funds and 
remanded the case for consideration of that issue. 148 Preventing 
'" The court in Gage v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1220 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), stated, "Intervention to prevent environmental harm from private and non-federal 
action ... may very well go beyond [an agency's] organic power .... " 
"
5 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973). 
'" 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972). 
'" Id. 
"' 473 F.2d at 288-90. The Court reasoned tha~ HUD was actually the benefactor of the 
private developer and that the extensive nexus between the Department and the devel-
oper gave the district court jurisdiction to enjoin the private action. See also Gifford-Hill 
& Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 389 F. Supp. 167, 174 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 
730 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (NEPA applies to actions by non-federal parties which have environ-
mental impact and for which federal permission is required); Boston Waterfront Re-
sidents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972) (private recipient of HUD 
grant enjoined from proceeding with demolition work until HUD had complied with 
NEPA). But see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration enjoined from granting money to State of Virginia for construction pend-
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action in the private sector prior to the filing of the EIS, even by 
resort to litigation, would be an important step in preserving the 
environment. 
Significantly, CEQ has attempted to define clearly the rela-
tionship between its forestalled action provision and program-
matic EIS's. If this relationship remained unclear, components 
of a proposed program could proceed despite the fact that the 
program itself might be abandoned. Thus, action which might 
not be required if an overall program· is ultimately abandoned 
cannot, under section 1506.l(c), be taken independently of that 
program.149 This section clearly expresses CEQ's intention that 
the forestalled action provision apply not only to individual 
projects, but also to more generalized federal programs that may 
include any number of individual projects. 150 
The forestalled action provision of section 1506.1 is one of the 
vaguest in the new guidelines. The concept of "appropriate ac-
tion to insure that the objectives and procedures of NEPA are 
achieved" will have to be more precisely defined by each agency. 
Only time will tell whether a definition can,_ be formulated which 
helps agencies to effectuate CEQ's intention that private actors 
not cause environmental harm pending the approval of a project 
by a federal agency. 
ing preparation of EIS, but state not enjoined from proceeding with construction of pro-
posed penal facility). 
"' 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(c) (1979) (emphasis added) provides that "agencies shall not 
undertake ... any major Federal action covered by [a program under assessment] which 
may significantly affect the quality of the human environment unless such action: (1) [i]s 
justified independently of the program; (2) [i]s itself accompanied by an adequate [EIS]; 
and (3) [w]ill not prejudice the ultimate decision on the program." See Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (an EIS need not be 
prepared for every component project in a program if an alternative form of environmen-
tal assessment is performed). See also notes 125-28 and accompanying text supra. 
150 It is also implicit in the prohibition of action before a record of decision has been 
filed, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(a) (1979), that an agency should not proceed with a project that 
is part of a program for which a programmatic EIS has not been completed. When an 
individual project is part of a program, the program is normally approved prior to the 
project. An individual project, however, may be small enough to pass even the strictest 
scrutiny for adverse environmental consequences, while the program of which that pro-
ject is a part might wreak environmental havoc. While § 1506.l(c) (3) guards against the 
"sunk cost" argument, discussed in note 125 and accompaning text supra, by proscribing 
action that will influence the ultimate decision on the program, that provision does not 
guard against the possibility that the agency will fail altogether to prepare a program-
matic EIS. It must be remembered that these guidelines are, in essence, a form of coer-
cion to attain compliance with NEPA. Thus, CEQ should clarify that programmatic 
EIS's must be prepared when the overall effect of a sufficiently related series of actions 
will be environmentally adverse. 
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C. Administrative Economy 
Bureaucratic systems are commonly criticized for being inher-
ently wasteful. Agencies have proven to be particularly vulnera-
ble to this criticism in the preparation of EIS's, most often be-
cause they must develop information for an EIS that either does 
not fall within-their areas of expertise, or has already been devel-
oped or is being developed contemporaneously by other 
agencies. 151 
CEQ has attempted to ameliorate this situation by providing 
for cooperation among federal, state, and local governmental 
agencies in developing data and preparing EIS's. First, the 
guidelines set up procedures for establishing a hierarchy of 
lead 152 and cooperating153 agencies in the preparation of an EIS. 
A federal agency, or at least one federal agency where there are 
multiple lead agencies, must play the role of the lead agency, 154 
while an arm of any governmental entity may perform the func-
tions of a cooper a ting agency. 155 
Second, sections 1506.2158 and 1506.4157 focus on a common fea-
ture of bureaucratic waste, unnecessary duplication of effort. 
Section 1506.4 provides simply· that the EIS or any other envi-
ronmental document "may be combined with any other agency 
document to reduce duplication and paperwork."158 Section 
1506.2 is aimed at eliminating duplication of efforts by federal 
agencies and state and local bodies by providing for joint plan-
ning, research, hearings, and environmental assessments when 
such bodies are dealing with similar problems. 159 
The emphasis on interagency cooperation, if implemented, 
would help diminish bureaucratic waste. Overall expenditures 
151 Federal agencies may not only duplicate the efforts of other federal agencies, but of 
state and local bodies as well. 
152 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (1979). This section outlines the process for selecting the lead 
agency. Specific duties of the lead agency are set out throughout the regulations. 
153 Id. § 1501.6. This part is the complement of § 1501.5. 
llM Id. § 1501.5(b). 
155 Id. § 1506.2(b). 
1 .. Id. § 1506.2. 
"' Id. § 1506.4. 
,.. Presumably, this does not mean that environmental information can be so commin-
gled with other data that the former is obscured. In Greene County Planning Board v. 
Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), the court stated that a conglomer-
ation of reports and testimony "cannot replace a single coherent and comprehensive envi-
ronmental analysis . . . . " 
158 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(h) (1979). CEQ envisions that adherence to this section shall "to 
the fullest extent possible include joint environmental impact statements." Id. § 
1506.2(c). These shall discuss, among other things, problems that may arise as a direct 
result of problems or laws peculiar to the state or states involved. Id. § 1506.2(d). 
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would be decreased because agencies would pool their resources. 
Disputes among lead and cooperating agencies would, ideally, be 
reconciled at the preparation stage rather than being raised for 
the first time when agencies comment on the draft EIS. 160 Later 
disagreement and unnecessary delay might be minimized be-
cause the division of assignments would have been made by all 
participating agencies through the scoping process. 181 Further-
more, coordination of time, money, and intellectual resources of 
every level of government would produce a better overall result 
than would be achieved by separate efforts under the prevailing 
practices. 182 
It is uncertain, however, whether eliminating disjointed exer-
cise of authority will lead to more rational consideration of envi-
ronmental concerns in decisionmaking. It has been argued that 
redundancy is instrumental in attaining reliable decisions. 183 The 
leading proponent of this theory points out that while zero re-
dundancy, i.e., eliminating all duplication of effort, has become 
a benchmark of both economy and efficiency in decisionmaking, 
it may actually be a great hindrance to the latter .18' 
This is a valid criticism of the doctrine of zero redundancy and 
is particularly apposite in the NEPA context. Because the art of 
1'° See generally id. § 1506.10 concerning time period allotted for commenting on draft 
EIS's. 
111 Id. § 1501.6(b)(2). See notes 51-64 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of 
the scoping process. 
112 In the introductory materials to the new regulations, CEQ sets out its goals for the 
new regulations in the following sequence: first, reducing paperwork; second, reducing 
delay; and finally, better decisions. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 1 (1978). This order might 
convey an order of priorities; the order in which the purposes of the guidelines are set out 
could certainly lead one to believe that CEQ adheres to the traditional agency position 
that NEPA's procedural requirements are of greater importance than its substantive 
mandates. In the case of the sections concerning administrative economy, CEQ may have 
. failed to see the forest-better decisions-for its obsession with the trees-reducing dupli-
cation of effort. 
An alternative view is that CEQ is attempting to mask its actual intent. President 
Carter's Exec. Order No. 11,991 emphasized that the new regulations are to implement 
the procedural provisions of NEPA. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). CEQ has arguably gone 
beyond this mandate and produced a set of regulations that will affect substantive ac-
tions of federal decisionmakers. 
113 Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 
PUB. Ao. REv. 346 (1969), reprinted in BUREAUCRATIC PoWER IN NATIONAL PoLmcs 337 (2d 
ed. F. Rourke 1972). 
1
" Id. at 339. The author states: "[R]edundancy is e powerful device for the suppres-
sion of error." Id. at 340. A famous study by Von Neumann originally advanced the the-
ory that a decisionmaking organization can be more reliable than any one of its compo-
nent parts by including sufficient duplication of efforts. Von Neumann, Probablistic 
Logic and the Synthesis of Reliable Organizations from Unreliable Components, re-
printed in AUTOMATA STUDIES (C.E. Shannon & J. McCarthy eds. 1956). Landau goes on 
to cite instances where a lack of redundancy has resulted in costly errors in decisionmek-
ing. Landau, supra note 163, at 344. 
396 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 13:2 
environmental assessment is less developed than many other sci-
ences, placing ultimate confidence in a single study may be im-
prudent. Duplicative efforts could well reveal errors or differ-
ences of opinion of which decisionmakers would otherwise be 
unaware. The zero redundancy theory may not be a practical so-
lution to current bureaucratic ills. A compromise aimed at de-
creasing bureaucratic waste, without a corresponding decrease in 
the accuracy and comprehensiveness of decisionmaking aids 
such as the EIS, would be preferable to the absolute approach 
taken by CEQ in the new regulations. 
D. Secondary Effects of the Procedural Provisions 
In addition to their direct effects, the procedural provisions 
could have a secondary impact which would profoundly affect 
agency decisionmaking. The provisions establish a uniform basis 
for NEPA compliance. The advantages of this change are three-
fold. First, although agencies have heretofore promulgated their 
own regulations pursuant to NEPA165 and thus standardized 
their own EIS's, when all EIS's are prepared in a similar man-
ner, members of Congress, reviewing courts, the public, and offi-
cials of agencies other than the preparing agency or agencies will 
find them easier to read and understand. Second, the extensive 
cooperation among agencies provided for in the new regulations 
will be facilitated if parallel procedures are followed by agencies 
collaborating on a single EIS. Finally, the uniformity of the pro-
cess from project to project will enable agency staffs to develop 
expertise in the preparation of EIS's, simultaneously expediting 
the preparation and improving the quality of the EIS's. 
IV. REQUIREMENTS AFTER THE EIS IS PREPARED 
In addition to provisions aimed at transforming the EIS into a 
valuable tool for agency decisionmakers, the new guidelines in-
clude post-EIS measures which further ensure that the policies 
set out in sections 101 and 102(1) of NEPA are carried out by 
federal agencies. Two such significant measures are the require-
ments that methods for mitigating the adverse environmental 
consequences of an agency project be developed and that a con-
cise "record of decision" be published after the final agency de-
termination on a project requiring an EIS has been made. 
11• Under 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (1979), each agency must also adopt any procedures nec-
essary to supplement the new guidelines. 
WINTER 1980) New CEQ Regulations 397 
A. Mitigation of Environmental Harm 
One might infer from NEPA that agencies are obliged, under 
the Act, to minimize damage to the environment. In the policy 
declaration of section 101(a) 188 the Act states that the federal 
government is to "use all practicable means and measures . . . 
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature 
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, 
and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans." 187 In no other section, however, does the Act refer to 
mitigation. There is little available data as to whether agencies 
have actually taken it upon themselves to mitigate environmen-
tal harm in projects in which it would be appropriate to do so. 
The goal of mitigating environmental damage did not origi-
nate with CEQ. Both commentators188 and courts189 have stated 
that an EIS should discuss measures for minimizing harm to the 
environment. A few courts have held that agencies are responsi-
ble for mitigating environmental damage in particular situa-
tions, though they have not based this conclusion on the statu-
tory language quoted above. In Akers v. Resor, 170 for example, 
the court found that a Corps of Engineers' decision to proceed 
with a stream channelization project was improper under the 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958171 because the Corps 
failed to establish measures of mitigation mandated by NEPA. 172 
Resor raises the question whether Congress contemplated, and 
the new guidelines establish, a duty to mitigate environmental 
harm. One district court has answered this question in the af-
firmative. In Gillham Dam, 173 the court viewed NEPA as evi-
dence of congressional intent to "create a duty on the part of 
federal agencies to prevent or minimize unjustifiable environ-
mental degradation resulting from their activities."174 
Ill 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976), 
"' Id. (emphasis added). 
'" See, e.g., D'Amato & Baxter, supra note 113, at 198. 
"' See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited 
v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 349 F. Supp. 
1289, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1973), mod. & rem'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 
982 (5th Cir. 1974). 
11• 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
171 16 u.s.c. §§ 661-664 (1976). 
172 The court reasoned that NEPA required the interpretation of the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act in accordance with NEPA. 339 F. Supp. at 1380. 
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 
1971), injunction dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. ), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (flood control project temporarily enjoined on 
basis of inadequate EIS.) 
"' Id. at 755. 
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CEQ, however, does not make it clear that an agency has a 
duty to mitigate harm. In section 1505.3, entitled "Implementing 
the decision, " 175 the Council dictates that mitigation measures 
shall be implemented if developed during the environmental 
evaluation of the project and committed as part of the agency's 
decision. Use of a conjunctive structure implies that agencies are 
not necessarily required to adopt mitigation measures that are 
included in alternatives considered in the EIS. 178 Similarly, 
under section 1505.2(c), an agency is to "state whether all practi-
cable measures to avoid or minimize environmental harm" have 
been adopted, implying that the agency may have the power to 
decline to adopt such methods. 
In section 1505.3(b), however, CEQ has provided that lead 
agencies shall "condition funding of actions on mitigation."177 
That language indicates that CEQ intends that mitigation mea-
sures be adopted as part of agency decisions. Moreover, the dis-
cussion in the EIS of each alternative and the proposed action 
must, according to section 1502.14(f), "include appropriate miti-
gation measures not already included in the proposed action or 
alternatives."178 If, as implied by section 1502.14,178 agencies are 
strictly limited to alternatives discussed in the EIS, their choice 
would necessarily include the mitigation measures dictated by 
section 1502.14(f). The agencies would, therefore, have a duty to 
mitigate environmental harm. 
Regardless of whether such a duty would be enforced by a 
court, the fact that the EIS must focus on mitigation measures 
can do a great deal to implement NEPA's policies. Agencies will 
be forced to investigate avenues for minimizing environmental 
degradation and to publish information about mitigation mea-
sures in EIS's. Decisions concerning which mitigation measures, 
m 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1979). 
171 See note 178 and accompanying text infra. 
111 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3(b) (1979). 
171 Id. § 1502.14(0 (1979). The provision in§ 1502.14(0 is reinforced by a similar provi-
sion in § 1502.16(h), which details the scientific and analytic bases for the comparisons 
required under § 1502.14. 
171 Id. § 1502.14 (1979) states that an EIS must provide "a clear basis for choice among 
options by the decisionmaker and the public." Development and evaluation of alterna-
tives with this end in mind can only indicate an intention that the decisionmaker must 
choose one. If the. decisionmaker were free to choose an alternative not evaluated in the 
EIS, the purpose of the Act and the regulations would clearly be circumvented. 
Section 1505.l(e) requires only that the "alternatives considered by the decisionmaker 
[be] encompassed by the range of alternatives discussed in the relevant environmental 
documents." Id. § 1505.l(e). This arguably permits modification of any proposed alterna-
tive by the decisionmaker. It is equally arguable, however, that any attempt to eliminate 
mitigation measures would remove an alternative from the "range of alternatives" con-
sidered in the EIS. 
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if any, will be adopted should therefore be subject to more in-
formed and extensive extra-agency scrutiny. 
B. Record of Decision 
In order to facilitate judicial review of an agency decision 
under the standards set forth in section 706(2) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 180 the agency must develop a record set-
ting forth all evidence considered in reaching that decision. With 
limited exceptions181 any document included in such a record· is 
available to the public under the terms of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. 182· The EIS would be part of such a record, and 
hence available to the public. The rationale for an agency's deci-
sion to proceed with or abandon a particular project after the 
EIS has been considered, however, may not be so easily 
accessible. · 
Public accountability for decisions is a common technique for 
combatting institutional biases and identifying the bases of deci-
sions. In a bold effort to assure adherence to NEPA's policies 
and to facilitate participation by both the public and the courts 
in achieving that goal, CEQ has required agencies to prepare a 
"record of decision" for each decision which involves the prepa-
ration of an EIS.'83 The record of decision must state the 
agency's decision, 184 identify all alternatives considered, specify 
the environmentally preferable alternative or alternatives, 185 
180 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). Currently, the definitive statement of the standard of judi-
cial review of administrative actions is the "substantial inquiry or hard look" test applied 
by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971). In describing courts' obligations under the Overton Park test, the Court 
stated that while review of agencies' factual determinations is to be "searching and care-
ful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. [Nor is t]he court ... empowered to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id. at 416. NEPA litigation in which the 
"hard look" test has been applied includes Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River), 486 
F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic En-
ergy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Some courts have imposed a stricter, objective good faith standard on administrative 
agencies when only the adequacy of an EIS is in question. See, e.g., National Helium 
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). 
A possible rationale for such an approach is that agencies are not entitled to the same 
deference in environmental matters as they are accorded, under the APA, in areas within 
their expertise. See also E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 312. 
m Administrative Procedure Act, § 552 (b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
"' 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1976). 
,a 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1979). 
'"' Id. § 1505.2(a). 
,.., In the draft guidelines the identification of the environmentally preferable alterna-
tive was to be made in the EIS itself, § 1502.14(e), 43 Fed. Reg. 25,237, col. 3 (1978). 
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identify all factors, environmental and non-environmental, con-
sidered by agency decisionmakers, 188 and discuss the impact of 
those factors on the ultimate decision. 187 In addition, the record 
must state whether all practicable mitigation measures included 
in the chosen alternative have been adopted, 188 explain why any 
rejected mitigation measures have not been adopted, 189 and set 
out the agency's planned monitoring and enforcement program 
for any mitigation measures adopted. 190 Requiring a record of de-
cision may be no more than a particularization of the traditional 
requirement that an agency produce a record suitable. for review 
by the courts. In Ely v. Velde 191 the court held that in addition to 
satisfying the express mandate of NEPA the agency was obli-
gated to "explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its 
reasoning"192 so that courts could independently evaluate 
whether or not it has fulfilled its obligations under NEP A. 193 
It has been argued that visibility promotes responsibility in 
agencies' fulfillment of their statutory obligations. 194 The most 
obvious advantage of the record of decision is that it resists 
"closed door decisionmaking," the insulation of the agency from 
all but select constituents concerned with its organic mission. 195 
The new regulations prevent agencies from insulating themselves 
and their decisions from scrutiny by those with different orienta-
tions. They enable outsiders to pressure an agency into taking 
account of national policy goals not integrally related to the lat-
ter's statutory mission. 
Opening the agency decisionmaking process to the public can 
improve decisionmaking in two important ways. First, it facili-
tates a thorough airing of the issues. Since the record of decision 
requirement forces articulation and explanation of agencies' de-
cisions, public awareness will be heightened. This, in tum, will 
open formerly closed channels of communication to the public, 198 
181 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1979). 
,11 Id. 
181 Id. § 1505.2 (c) (1979). 
181 Id. 
"• Id. 
111 451 F. 2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (construction of penal facility ordered enjoined pend-
ing preparation of EIS). 
112 Id. at 1139. 
m Id. at 1138-39. 
'" Wilson, The Study of Administration, ~POL.SCI. Q. 197, 213 (1887), reprinted in 56 
PoL. Sci. Q. 481 (1941). 
m Strobehn, supra note 32, at 103. Closed door decisionmaking would be inexcusable 
under even the most conservative interpretation of NEPA, namely, that it is merely an 
environmental disclosure law, since failure to publicize the contents of an EIS would 
preclude disclosure of the environmental assessment. 
'" Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 515. 
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and should lead to more thoughtful and responsible deci-
sionmaking. 
Second, a record of decision will make it more difficult for 
decisionmakers to obfuscate th~ bases of their decisions. This 
should foster greater accountability to the general public and 
hence greater sensitivity to their concerns. When an agency be-
comes responsive to a broader constituency, it also becomes sen-
sitive to a wider range of political viewpoints. If agencies become 
responsive to political input based on environmental concerns 
their decisions will take greater account of environmental protec-
tion, which Congress has declared a national policy objective. 
Many criticisms have been levelled against theories of open 
decisionmaking in general and against CEQ's "record of deci-
sion" in particular.197 In the context of NEPA, this argument is 
based on the fact that it may be "politically distasteful" to de-
scribe in detail how the integrity of the environment has been 
sacrificed in favor of other policy concerns. 198 Admittedly, some 
social impacts "are taboo subjects for written public .docu-
ments."199 Agencies are reluctant to highlight the role of status, 
class, or culture in their decisions. Government decisions are 
produced by the bureaucratic process, and, it is sometimes ar-
gued, the public is incapable of understanding how and why our 
institutions sometimes fail to produce optimal results.200 
Federal agencies were particularly unhappy with the prospect 
of identifying the environmentally preferable alternative, 
whether in the EIS as the draft guidelines required, or in the 
record of decision.201 They felt that doing so would, in effect, es-
117 Comments of General Public, on file at Council of Environmental Quality, 722 
Jackson Place, Washington, D.C. One government employee, expressing her personal 
views, commented, "[I]t is probably unrealistic to expect a political appointee to publicly 
air the rationale for a political decision." Letter to Nicholas C. Yost (Aug. 10, 1978), on 
file at Council of Environmental Quality, 722 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C. 
115 Comment, CEQ Proposes Ambitious NEPA Regulations for Comment, Stands 
Ground Despite Agency Criticism, (1978] 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10,129, 10,130. 
'" Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 3347-48. The authors remark, it is often a 
"myth that [government] programs serve an undifferentiated public interest." Id. at 348. 
200 Many theories have been advanced to explain the failure to reach optimal results. 
No single theory emphasizes every fault of the system, and usually several are applicable 
to one agency or even to the decision on a single project. See, e.g., the positivist model 
based on pure rationality, SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1957), the incre-
mentalist model, LINDBLOM, Tm: mTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISIONMAKING THROUGH 
MvruAL AwusTMENT (1965), the mixed scanning approach, Etziani, Mixed Scanning: A 
"Third" Approach to Decision-making, 27 Pua. AD REv. 385 (1967). See also W. GoRE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING (1964); D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF 
DECISION (1963); P. WOLL, PUBLIC POLICY ch. 2 (1974); BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL 
POLITICS (2d ed. F. Rourke 1972); READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, Part IV (2d 
ed. R. Wolfinger 1970). 
201 Comment, supra note 36, at 10,045. 
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tablish a priority for environmental policies over others.202 CEQ 
responded that the record of decision and identification of the 
environmentally preferable alternative require only an explica-
tion of the agency's choice, not an ultimate decision.203 This posi-
tion is reflected by a substantiai change in language between the 
draft and final regulations. In the draft regulations agencies were 
directed to state "their reasons why other specific con_siderations 
of national policy overrode [the environmentally preferable] al-
tematives."204 The final regulations soften this language by re-
quiring an agency to "identify and discuss" all factors-contribut-
ing to the choice of one alternative over another "including any 
essential considerations of national policy."205 In changing this 
language, CEQ has avoided forcing agencies to confront the 
question of why the environmentally preferable alternative or al-
ternatives were rejected. 
The desirability of this result is questionable. NEPA was a re-
sponse to the practice of cutting environmental comers in order 
to achieve other types of ends; its aim is to achieve parity for 
environmental values with other, more traditional, ones. Thus, 
while emphasizing environmental concerns may appear to place 
a premium on them, such emphasis may be necessary to achieve 
the reorientation envisioned by Congress. 
Another problem is that while the record of decision does not 
transform the EIS into a decision document, 208 in practice it es-
tablishes a decision document that concentrates on environmen-
tal policy rather than national policy objectives in general. 
NEPA dictates only the preparation of an information docu-
ment, not a decision document.207 In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 208 a leading NEPA case, the Court of 
202 Id. at 10,046. This assertion is supported by the fact that no similar requirement 
exists for identifying either the socially, culturally, economically, or technically prefera-
ble alternative. 
203 Id. 
204 Section 1505.2(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 25,240, col. 3 (June 9, 1978). 
"'" 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1979). 
"'" For the purpose of this article, the term "decision document" refers to a document 
presenting the evidence considered by an agency, stating the policies which influenced 
the decision, and explaining how the agency reached its conclusion in light of both the 
evidence and those policies. Thus, a decision document focuses on the process of choice. 
On the other hand, an "information document," such as an EIS, focuses on the process of 
assessment. See generally E. DoLGIN & T. GUIIJ!ERT, supra note 1, at 443-44. 
2117 NEPA, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
208 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The apparent purpose of the [EIS] is to aid 
in the agency's own decisionmaking process .... "). But see Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the Eighth Circuit sug-
gested that an EIS might serve as a decision document, stating that "[t]he agency must 
also explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its reasoning." Id. at 351. Thus, 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that the Act does 
not mandate the preparation of a decision document. Calvert 
Cliffs' concerned the construction of a nuclear power plant which 
was enjoined because the initial EIS was inadequate. Neverthe-
less, the Atomic Energy Commission ultimately decided to ap-
prove the plant, which is presently in operation. 
The danger of requiring what is essentially a decision docu-
ment which concentrates on environmental concerns is that 
nonenvironmental project justifications, such as economic, tech-
nical, social, and cultural considerations might be "swallowed 
up."209 Courts have, of course, required agencies to justify their 
decisions somewhere in the official record. As noted above, the 
court Ely v. Velde210 stated that agencies cannot keep their 
thought processes "under wraps."211 There has been little indica-
tion, however, that courts interpret NEPA to require justifica-
tion for an agency's decision in an EIS, 212 or under any NEPA 
provision. Nevertheless, this is essentially what CEQ has done 
by requiring a record of decision emphasizing environmental val-
ues in guidelines promulgated under NEPA. 213 
The record of decision required by section 1505.2 constitutes a 
radical departure from the traditional conception . of the role of 
an EIS. President Carter ordered CEQ to promulgate regulations 
to implement the procedural provisions of NEPA.214 Nowhere 
does NEPA require or suggest that any document other than an 
EIS be prepared. Thus, to enforce section 1505.2, a court would 
have to find (1) that the President can require agencies to per-
form duties beyond those imposed by a statute in order to imple-
ment that statute, and (2) that the record of decision is neces-
sary to the implementation of NEPA's procedural provisions. 
"the complete formal impact statement represents an accessible means for opening up 
the agency decision-making process and subjecting it to critical evaluation by those out-
side the agency, including the public." Id. (citations omitted). 
209 F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 255. 
21 • 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
211 Id. at 1138. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 
(8th Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. 
Mitchell (Hanly I), 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Gilham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 728 
(E.D. Ark. 1971). 
212 But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972). 
21• In its record of decision, an agency is free to include information not required by § 
1505.2. By so doing, an agency can dull the impact of a record of decision which focuses 
exclusively on environmental considerations. 
211 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
CEQ's new regulations for the preparation of environmental 
impact statements contain three significant types of provisions. 
First, the regulations require that all substantive information 
necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the environmental 
effects of a proposed action and alternatives thereto be included 
in the EIS. Second, the regulations establish procedures to en-
sure that the information in the EIS will be considered by deci-
sionmakers. Finally, certain provisions of the new regulations are 
aimed at furthering environmental protection once the EIS is 
completed. Many provisions of the regulations merely restate 
previously prevailing practices. Those which have been discussed 
in this article are either innovative or especially signific:ant. 
While these latter provisions pose some problems due to lack of 
clarity and potential difficulties in implementation, on the whole 
they should improve environmental impact statements, enable 
decisionmakers to make better use of the statements, and foster 
heightened awareness of environmental concern in federal deci-
sionmaking. Thus, the regulations should help considerably in 
implementing the policies articulated in NEPA over a decade 
ago. 
-David M. Lesser 
